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Abstract
Based on the expected hazards related to the
commissioning period and the operation of the LHC, the
list of the systems involved in the safety of the LHC will
be presented. More specifically the concept of the access
control and the machine interlock systems will be briefly
presented. A classification of the different constraints
associated to the design of the LHC access control and
the machine interlock systems will be established and
the related consequences, for example on the technical
and the operational aspects, will be pointed out. Finally
an access scenario will be proposed in order to stress the
definition of the user's requirements.
1  INTRODUCTION
The recent documents sent during the drafting of the
Rapport Préliminaire  de Sûreté du LHC (Preliminary
Report on the Safety of LHC) [1] to the French
authorities responsible for Basic Nuclear Installations
have made it possible to re-affirm the access concept
employed at CERN, to endorse it and lastly to apply it to
LHC. It should be recalled that access to the tunnels and
LHC experiment  is  based on routing through 4 grades
of area (Fig. 1)  whose inherent risks determine the type
of controls instituted.
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 Figure 1: Access to and classification of underground
structures in the LHC, the concept.
This document is concerned with aspects of the
systems  planned for the restricted  underground areas of
LHC  and the tunnels/experiment of LHC, i.e. the safety
systems (access control and beam interlock) for the
accelerator.
The procedure adopted consists in collecting the
intrinsic constraints and defining the performance
criteria required for each area identified in this concept.
Thus it ends up by specifying the functions required to
meet needs. The procedure has been applied to the
sites/buildings of LHC and the unrestricted underground
areas of LHC. It has resulted, in particular in identifying
and setting up traffic islands in the SPS (site access
control), individual buildings of the SPS (buildings
access control) and earmarking pit-head islands for
access to  the unrestricted underground areas of LHC.
The aim of this document is to initiate the process for
the LHC safety systems. Based on this initial analysis,
technical proposals and ways of identifying needs for the
Equipment, Control and Supervision layers will be
presented and must be submitted for approval by
committees responsible for the LHC project (in
particular, LHC-TCC and LEMIC).
2  LHC OPERATIONAL MODES
 2.1 Main operational modes
The LHC operational  modes are listed as follows:
x Machine mode (beams present / machine
equipment supplied):
- Access shall be prohibited and locked in secure
position.
- Activation of the emergency entrance/exit system
will result in  the shutting down of all injected and
circulating beams from LHC and in holding them at
stop position.
x Restricted controlled access or technical stop (no
beams / power maintained to certain machines and
equipment):
- The injected and circulating beams shall be shut
down and held at stop position but certain of the
equipment shall still be under power.
- Access to specific sectors shall be authorised for a
limited number of individuals.
- If a locked door to an unauthorised  sector is
opened (door forced), all the equipment concerned
will be put into secure position.
The duration of a technical stop is set at one hour
every 24 hours
x Supervised access mode (beams down/machine
equipment halted):
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Short shutdown mode:
- The injected and circulating beams shall be shut
down and held in secure stop position in the LHC
tunnels.
- Access to anywhere in the machine shall be
authorised as a function of the inherent risks and
take place under the supervision of an operator in
the control room.
The short shutdowns shall be planned to last less
than a month.
Long shutdown mode:
- The injected and circulating beams shall be stopped
and held at secure stop position.
- Access to anywhere in the machine shall be
authorised as a function of the inherent risks and
take place either in automatic mode or under the
supervision of an operator in a control room.
A long shutdown shall last approximately three
months.
Moreover, when controlled access mode ends, all
restricted areas of the LHC will be subject to a close-
down inspection patrol.
 2.2 Proposed access modes
CLOSED + VETO (access denied)
Applied/removed manually (key) by the radio-protection
technicians.
CLOSED
Corresponds to the machine operation mode. The LHC
machine is running or is about to start.
TEST
This mode is equivalent to the CLOSED mode but it is
applied on specific LHC test areas.
PATROL/SURVEY
This is an access mode with a very restricted Personnel
database (radio-protection technicians, patrol teams).
SUPERVISED RESTRICTED
This is an access mode with a restricted Personnel
database (e.g. RF people only…).
SUPERVISED
This is the "normal" access mode with the main
Personnel database.
CONTROLLED AUTOMATIC
During Long Shutdown, it might be possible (if
approved) to access in an automatic mode (without
human supervision), in very specific areas (to be
defined).
3  IDENTIFICATION AND
CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTRAINTS
 3.1 Characteristics of users
All persons working for the Organization must possess
non-transferable access cards in their own names, issued
by the Administrative Services (AS) in accordance with
Operational Circular No.  2 (October 1994) published
by the then Personnel Division. As access to LHC
underground structures (restricted and unrestricted areas)
requires a film badge, these are issued by TIS/RP Group
to individuals who have undergone the relevant medical
tests and attended the appropriate safety courses.
Moreover, the special authorizations for LHC must be
issued through the Authorization Management System -
AMS, by duly appointed CERN officials.
 3.2 Organizational constraints
Operational project management
The LHC project uses an operational management
project tool [2] broken down organizationally into the
following roles (Fig. 2):
x Client:
Ö  Product Owner
- purchases the product,
- can halt the project at any moment.
Ö Product Manager
- identifies the final  milestone of the project,
- is the project director,
- represents the users of the product to be
supplied.
x Supplier:
Ö  Project Owner
- is financially responsible for due completion of
the project,
- he may allocate additional resources to the
project after agreement with the Product Owner.
Ö Project Manager
- manages the project until completion,
- is the project leader,
- represents the contributors and is in regular
contact with the Product Manager to ensure that
the supplies are those that meet users’ needs.
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Figure 2: Operational project management.
Organization of the LHC Project
The way the above-mentioned organisational model is
applied to the LHC is shown in Figure 3. The
responsibility of contributors to the LHC project is
shared by all the different divisions in CERN.  On the
other hand, the various trades and/or technical skills
depend on services provided by other divisions (for
example: IT, SL-CO, ST-EL , etc.). To that end LHC
Project Engineers have been appointed to lead what
might be called LHC sub-projects. It is their task to
provide the different equipment, machinery and services
necessary for the completion of LHC and to arrange for
co-ordination with the CERN services they need to draw
on.
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Figure 3: Organization of the LHC project’s operational
management.
Organizational arrangements for the sub-project
providing security systems for LHC
The sub-project to provide security systems for LHC
concerns a major part of the LHC  project organisation
as well as identifying needs associated with access.  In
fact, if the beam interlock system interfaces are to be
defined, the  accelerator shut-down scenarios have to be
identified.  This system must provide  equipment safety
functions, and so the services and working groups
dealing with the accelerator itself are represented as
safety system users.
The contributors involved in providing the LHC
security  systems come from different CERN services
and groups such as ST-EL, for supplying power to the
systems and for audio-communication networks, IT, for
public data communication networks…
Although essential, this  project management structure
displays certain constraints, inter alia for the precise
identification of needs. For this reason the security
system functions proposed need to undergo successive
phases of validation by different committees in the LHC
project
 3.3 INB constraints
Operation of LHC requires licensing from the French
authorities in the person of the Direction de Sûreté des
Installations Nucléaires (DSIN). Such licensing stems
from a convention whereby CERN is committed to
providing precise documentation [3].
9 Impact study  on SPS, LHC (project launch phase)
9 Preliminary safety report on SPS, LHC (study
phase)
9 Interim safety report on SPS, LHC (start of
operational phase)
9 Final safety report on SPS, LHC (initial
experimental feedback)
The final safety report will be subjected to an expert
inspection commissioned by the DSIN from the French
Institut de Protection des Installations Nucléaires (IPSN)
[Institute for the Protection of Nuclear Installations] The
conclusions of the inspection  and the recommendations
deriving therefrom will be presented to a meeting of the
Groupe Permanent Usine des Installations Nucléaires de
Bases (GPU). This latter body will approve, approve
subject to reservations or refuse an operating licence.
The contribution of the Access Control Section to the
INB documentation consists in detailed functional and
operational  descriptions of the access control and beam
interlock systems together with the summary and
conclusions of the safety analyses for these systems.
Although from the INB standpoint, the LHC is not
comparable with LEP, the recommendations made for
the LEP safety systems act as indications and major
constraints with regard to LHC systems design:
- redundant signals from the Eléments Importants de
la Sûreté (EIS) must be sent by physically
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independent paths anywhere in the safety system
architecture,
- where programmable logic controllers are used in
establishing safety systems, they must be self-
regulating;
- the accelerator restarts must be preceded by  a signal
indicating “beams imminent”.
 3.4 Operational constraints
Definition of access modes (§ 2) reveals a major
constraint  in the LHC access control system, namely the
absence of a free mode. In plain language this means
that the restricted areas of LHC are under constant
control (supervision). Corrective and preventive
maintenance must be carried out without hindering
controlled access to the accelerator. High availability is
therefore required at access points.
In machine mode, the safety systems must ensure that
all areas can be locked and, in particular that beams can
be immediately shut down and stopped from circulating
should an emergency door/gateway device be
inadvertently activated. High reliability is therefore
essential for the  specialised safety control systems.
 3.5 Environmental constraints
When beams are running, radiological, magnetic, and
electromagnetic disturbances, etc. created by the
accelerator form non-negligible constraints in protecting
the accelerator components.  Within the safety systems,
these constraints are particularly critical given that
breakdowns following alterations set in train by these
disturbances will cause the accelerator to shut down and
may harm major  machine components.
 3.6 Assembly constraints
Geographical constraint
 As in the case of LEP, the distances to be covered and
the number of signals to be sent constitute major
constraints, in particular for the architecture of the
control network associated with safety through the fact
that the safety systems signals must be routed to the
interlock system situated in the control room.
Topological constraint
The configuration of the underground structures of
LHC and the concentration of EIS access points in the
straight sections also act as constraints on the
architecture of local control systems associated with
safety and those associated with operation.
Material constraints
The major constraints governing access facilities stem
from the following considerations :
- access by personnel and equipment in bunches
(stress peaks on access facilities),
- the volume occupied by the machine in the LHC
tunnels and the need to leave a minimum of
clearance for lifting vehicles to pass through.
- reliable and sturdy mechanical locking of  access
gates/doors,
- in machine mode the various disturbances generated
by the environment have to be taken into account.
Constraint associated with system design
To minimize any risk of LHC safety systems failure,
experience together with analyses of safety factors for
LEP systems shows that redundant routing of current
looping and positive security signals alone provide the
best performances. This characteristic implies that high
availability  and high reliability automation systems
must be used. Back-up power for such systems must also
be taken into consideration.
Constraint associated with the installation and testing
of machine equipment parts
In the LHC installation planning schedule, a beam
injection tests phase has been projected for mid 2004. As
a result, temporary safety systems must be set up for the
sites and EIS-machine in question.
4  IDENTIFICATION AND
CLASSIFICATION OF MAIN FUNCTIONS
 4.1 Safety systems at LHC: reminder
As noted, the LHC safety systems are as follows :
- The purpose of the Système de contrôle des EIS-
accès (SCEa) is to control and command any
dedicated system/equipment/element/device…
(called EIS-accès)… used to prevent access in
dangerous areas, sectors marking the perimeter
limits and restricted areas of the LHC.
- The purpose of the Système de contrôle des EIS-
machine (SCEm) is to control and command any
dedicated system/equipment/element/device…
(called EIS-machine) from the machine generating a
risk for human life.
- The purpose of the Système de Gestion et de
Configuration de l'Interverrouillage (SGCI) is to
manage and configure all the Safety Chains. A
specific set of EIS-accès interlocked with their
related EIS-machine constitute a Safety Chain.
Following the operation modes,  VETOs (inhibition
commands) are generated by the Safety Chains and
sent either to the SCEa and to the SCEm.
191Chamonix XI
 4.2 Architecture and main functions of the
safety systems
The safety systems architecture has three distinct
layers:
- the Equipment layer corresponds to the process to
be controlled, it  is involved with all the EIS in the
LHC,
- the Control/Communication layer covers the
procedure’s management and control components.
For the safety systems, an industrial network based
on the use of specific Programmable Logic
Controllers is planned.
- the Supervision layer, as its name indicates,
contains the equipment and communications
infrastructure providing for supervision and
monitoring of the processes.
Within the different layers, each constituent element
of the safety systems fulfils specific dedicated functions
with regard to either access control or beam interlock.
They are  broken down according to the following two
main characteristics:
- safety ensuring accelerator shut-down in case of
inadvertent intrusion and protection of machine
components during such emergency stops.
Switching on of interlock commands for one of the
safety systems to another must be automatic and
highly reliable (fail-safe, redundancy, etc.),
- the operation of the access control system during
machine shut downs to supervise access
procedures. The fact that there is no free mode for
LHC implies that access functions and equipment
must have a high degree of availability, in
particular during technical stops (1 hour of access
every 24 hours).
 4.3 Functions associated with the Equipment
layer
The  LHC EIS-accès functions are mainly as follows,
the detailed breakdown for them to be laid out under the
technical specification for the safety systems.
- barrier for personnel and material access to different
areas and sectors of restricted areas of the LHC,
- locking and unlocking in line with the access
procedure associated with the access mode applied,
- emergency entrance and exit  using a mechanical
system,
- validation/verification that the shutdown patrol has
made its inspection,
- accounting for persons gaining access and guarantee
that the EIS-machine cannot be activated (token).
The safety signals
Signalling of an EIS state is defined by :
Safe position:
simultaneous display of SAFE and UNSAFE safety
signals,
Unsafe position:
simultaneous display of SAFE and UNSAFE safety
signals,
These paths are picked up by microswitches or
independent contacts placed and activated directly by the
position  that a given component is in.
An EIS is locked by a command or priority inhibition
path of the VETO type generated by the
control/command organs of the component to keep it in
safe position. This command is initiated by default
irrespective of the access mode, and is inhibited during
access procedures.
Routing of safety signals
Safety signals are connected by direct cables routed
down two separate physical paths towards the interface
modules with the control network. The distances
travelled (straight sections of the accelerator to shaft
heads) require signal relays. At the repeaters, an
abbreviated display of the signal states in transit is also
required.
Signals acquisition interface with the next highest
layer
The acquisition of safety signals at site level is done by
means of  cabled logic modules designed to provide an
interface with the local concentrator logic controllers.
The functions of the input and interface modules and
crates are as follows:
- relaying (upwards) and interface of signals for both
safe and unsafe positions,
- relaying (downwards) of the  various locking and
closing-off commands,
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- signaling the above-mentioned signal  states and
commands.
 4.4 Functions associated with the Control/Com-
munication layer
Spheres of use of automation systems
The features of the safety systems listed in § 4.2
themselves give the spheres of use for the PLC's that are
to be installed. In this way, the automation systems 1 on
2 and 2 on 2 (c.f. Fig. 4) can be identified. Switching
between them is accompanied by additional measures
but the compatibility of the hardware and software for
programming the controllers is ensured.
Functions associated with the Control/Communications
layer dedicated to safety
4.4.1 Acquisition and processing  of safety signals
The site concentration PLC's (2 on 2 system) used for
access control and beam interlock have the following
main functions:
- acquisition and reporting of safety signals,
- organization of signals for developing the main
interlocking , local and test runs,
- setting up interlocks for local and test run chains,
- generation of site results for use by the central
interlock system.
4.4.2  Routing of safety results
The results produced in this way must be routed via two
independent physical paths to the LHC site concentrators
affected by the local and test interlock chains as well as
to the main interlock system. The distances to be
covered (curved sections, distances between sites)
require the same functions as those described in  § 4.3.
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 Figure 4: Field of use of automation systems.
4.4.3  Result acquisition interface
Result acquisition takes place at the main control room
by means of cabled logic modules  providing an
interface with the central concentrator PLC's. The
functions of the acquisition and interface modules and
crates are as follows:
- relaying (upwards) and interface of both safe and
unsafe results,
- relaying (downwards) of the various interlock
commands,
- signaling the above-mentioned result states and
commands.
4.4.4  Acquisition and processing of results
The central concentrator PLC's (2 on 2 system) in the
access control and beam interlock systems have the
following main functions:
- acquisition and signaling of safety results,
- organization of signals for developing the main
locking, local and test chains,
- setting up interlocks for main, local and test chains,
- generating global results for use by the central
interlock system
4.4.5  The interlock system
The main functions fulfilled by the interlock system are
stated hereunder:
- Accounting for the position of the central security
keys and management of transitions between the
SCEa and SCEm systems,
- key release commands and manual activation
/inhibition commands for VETO signals,
- accounting for the position of dedicated central
safety keys for use in testing equipment and test
clearance management,
- automatic generation of different locking commands
implicit in safety systems.
All the different communications in the Control
/Communication layer dedicated to safety are made
using a cabled logic based on current loops (de-
)activated  by the safety PLC’s.
Functions associated with the Control/Communications
layer dedicated to operations
4.4.6  Management and control of the main access
points
The main LHC access points differ depending on
whether they are concerned with access to the machine
or to the experimental caverns.  The distinction resides
simply in the fact that the access points to the
experiment are fitted with tokens given their position
within an unrestricted area of LHC. The other access
points are considered as forming part of the machine test
area and hence also govern all the EIS in the given area.
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The principal functions of AC3 systems are summarized
hereunder:
- access barriers to test areas in  machine operation
mode,
- access barriers to areas during tests,
- emergency exits/entrances using a mechanical
system in case of evacuation,
- checking whether a film badge is held,
- issue of a personal interlocking device (solely for
access to experiment),
- checking whether there is a functioning dosimeter,
- accounting for numbers of persons with access to
the area.
The need for high availability in the utilisation of
the access points implies the use of Type 1 on 2
automation systems. The systems peripheral  to those
described above are listed as follows :
Functions associated with management of an access
point:
- updating of on-line data bases relating to personnel
with access rights,
- provision of a back-up data base in case the main
communication network fails,
- communication with the site concentrator PLC’s
(condition read-out).
Functions for the user interface
- test area panel display,
- signaling of access modes applied,
- list of names of persons issued with tokens,
- on-line description of access procedure.
Functions associated with maintenance of  an access
point:
- local record of past events,
- by-passing of access point for preventive and
corrective maintenance work.
4.4.7  Management and control of  pits-head access
points
As noted, such controlled access systems are the access
points to the restricted machine-dedicated areas. The
system's functions are summarized hereunder:
- access barriers to restricted areas in  machine
operation mode,
- emergency exits/entrances using mechanical
systems for evacuation
for operational access modes:
- verification of film badge possession,
- issuing a personal key system,
- accounting for persons with access to underground
structures.
The need for high availability in operating the
access control system implies the use of Type 1 on 2
automation systems. Functions peripheral to those
described above are as follows :
Functions associated with management of an access
point
- updating of on-line data bases for personnel with
access rights,
- provision of a back-up data base in case of outages
on main communication networks,
- communication with the site concentrator PLC’s
(condition read-outs).
Functions for the user interface
- panel display of local situations (signalling of all on-
site ISC states )
- signalling of access modes applied ,
- list (giving names) of tokens issued,
- on-line description of access procedure.
Functions associated with maintenance of an access
point
- local record of past events,
- by-passing of access point for preventive and
corrective maintenance work.
4.4.8  Routing of communications and SCADA
The LHC's high volume communication networks are at
present being defined.  The Communication
Infrastructure Working Group - CIWG is in charge of
compiling the  needs of the different services. To operate
the safety systems it has been requested that a high-
availability network be made available with
communication channel switch-over in case of power
failure.  For accelerator safety purposes,  a private
network should be specified.
Likewise, the dedicated  SCADA  for use in operating
LHC safety systems will be identified and specified
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through the studies and recommendations made by ST-
MO Group.
 4.5 Functions associated with the Supervision
layer
Supervision of the LHC safety systems from the main
control room or possibly from other control rooms
requires the following main functions, depending on the
operational mode:
In machine mode
Functions associated with the management of safety
systems:
- updating  and display of on-line data bases relating
to personnel with access rights,
- consultation and individual checking of access
authorizations,
- communication with central concentrator PLC’s
(condition read-outs).
Functions for the operator interface
- detailed display of general and local panels
(signaling of all LHC EIS states )
- general and individual display of situations
associated with interlock chains installed (interlock
system),
- video selection and  acquisition of all LHC
controlled access systems,
- automatic audio selection and communication with
displayed access points.
Functions associated with the maintenance of safety
systems:
- records of past events,
- generation and monitoring of technical alarms,
- help in diagnostics.
For access modes
Above functions, plus
Functions for operating the access control system:
- application and management of access modes,
- commands dedicated to access procedures,
- signalling and state of decentralized supervision
systems,
- on-line help for access procedures.
5.
 
SCENARIO FOR ACCESS TO THE
LHC MACHINE
In access mode, an authorized person wishing to enter
the LHC tunnel will be subject to the following main
controls:
Entry to site # and to Building SD# will be gained by
reading the person's CERN magnetic card, checking the
authorization will activate the access control systems
(road islands and buildings).
Inside Building SD is the pits-head access point,
denoting and controlling access to restricted areas.
Under the supervision of an operator he/she will go
through the  entry procedure.
Within the restricted area (Shaft PM), caverns and
service galleries in the tunnel), the individual  may move
around freely and pass through any other sector
barriers/doors  encountered.
Access to the main tunnel or the test area will be
governed by an unique access point.
6.
 
CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of safety systems for the LHC  involves
taking into account a large number of characteristics
associated with the accelerator's operation and above all,
the safety of personnel and equipment.   These
characteristics require the introduction of reliable
functions that take the different constraints into account.
As the human element is the weakest link in a safety
system, it is essential for technical architecture to be
designed that can take account of the constraints inherent
in the environment and operation of an accelerator like
the LHC.  At the same time, if too much  stress is placed
on removing the constraints, the  performances really
required run the risk of being changed.  Thus, the
discipline of the users and operators of the LHC has to
be achieved through simple instructions that will make
the safety systems work most effectively.
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